Gender stereotyping and wage discrimination among Italian graduates by Castagnetti, Carolina & Rosti, Luisa
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Gender stereotyping and wage
discrimination among Italian graduates
Carolina Castagnetti and Luisa Rosti
University of Pavia
September 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26685/
MPRA Paper No. 26685, posted 14. November 2010 18:46 UTC
 1
Gender stereotyping and wage discrimination among Italian graduates 
Carolina Castagnetti1    Luisa Rosti     
Università di Pavia                    Università di Pavia  
October 23, 2010 
Abstract 
This paper addresses the gender pay gap among Italian university graduates on entry to the labour 
market and stresses the importance of gender stereotypes on subjective assessment of individual 
productivity. Our data show that in contexts where the stereotype is most likely to occur, the 
unexplained component of the gender pay gap is higher. Moreover, we find evidence that being 
excellent at school does not ensures that a woman will be rewarded as an equivalently performing 
man, but serves to counteract the gender bias in on-the-job evaluations. 
JEL classification: J24, J7, J3 
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Introduction 
 
This paper explores the gender pay gap among Italian university graduates in the early years after 
labour market entry. Our data come from the Survey on Labour Market Transitions of University 
Graduates carried out in 2007 by the Italian National Statistical Office. By estimating the earnings 
equation for male and female employees working in full-time status we find a gender pay gap of 
11%2. By using the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, and controlling for possible self-
selection (two-stage Heckman procedure), we separate earnings differences due to differences in 
observed characteristics, usually referred to as “explained gender pay gap” (near to 12% in our data) 
from differences in returns to characteristics, usually referred to as “unexplained or residual gender 
pay gap” (near to 88% in our data). 
This finding is neither surprising nor trivial. 
The difference in pay per se is not surprising because in modern labour market imperfect 
information manifests itself by the existence of wage dispersion. If both the labour demand and 
supply are heterogeneous, wages are not uniform, but instead vary across demographic groups. The 
literature shows that when examining how earnings are distributed by sex we find that women earn 
less than men, and no matter how extensively regressions control for individual and company 
characteristics, an unexplained gender pay gap remains even among workers with almost no 
experience3. If the unexplained pay disparity sometimes favoured women and sometimes favoured 
men, there would be no reason for concern. But systematically and without exception finding that 
women earn less than men raises some non trivial questions (Hersch 2006). What unobserved 
something is it that can’t be measured, is correlated with sex, and explains more of a pay disparity 
that known determinants of earnings such as education and work experience? Following Becker 
                                                 
2
 In the definition currently used by Eurostat the Gender Pay Gap (in unadjusted form) represents the difference 
between average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of 
average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees (Eurostat 2009). The latest Eurostat data (2008) show that the 
gender pay gap is estimated to be 18% in the EU as a whole, and has practically remained constant during the last 15 
years. The so-called unadjusted measure of the gender pay gap used in European statistics captures the overall or 
raw gap in men’s and women’s hourly wages. Adjustment for observable characteristics reduces the gender pay gap 
but does not eliminate it and large differences remain. Using the European Community Household Panel Survey, the 
adjusted gender pay gap only accounts for less than half of the overall gap (EuroFound 2010).  
3
 For example, controlling for education, experience, personal characteristics, city and region, occupation, industry, 
government employment, and part-time status, Altonji and Blank (1999) find that only about 27 percent of the 
gender wage gap is explained by differences in characteristics. 
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(1957) and the mainstream literature on the gender pay gap we interpret unexplained sex disparities 
in pay that persist even with extensive controls for individuals and jobs characteristics as due to 
discrimination. Gender discrimination arises when the assessment of productivity is affected by 
stereotypes, that is non-conscious hypotheses, beliefs or expectations that influence our judgments 
of others (Valian 1998).  
We hypothesize that the effects of gender stereotypes as “a woman after pregnancy is a resource 
for the company lost” or “think manager, think male” are an important cause of statistical 
discrimination which is realized in the unexplained component of the gender pay gap. Following 
Heilman (1997) and Hunt et al. (2002) we identify some contexts in which stereotypes are more 
likely to occur and we verify that the most likely the stereotype, the higher the unexplained 
component of the gender pay gap. Finally, we show that an excellent educational performance 
serves to counteract the gender bias in on-the-job evaluations, even if being excellent at school does 
not ensures that a woman will be rewarded as an equivalently performing man. 
 
 
1 – Data 
 
Our data come from the Survey on Labour Market Transitions of University Graduates carried out 
in 2007 by the Italian National Statistical Office. The Survey is the result of interviewing Italians 
who graduated from university in 2004 three years after graduation. The retrospective information 
gathered allows us to analyze both employment probabilities and earnings at the beginning of their 
career (Tab. 1). The graduate population consists of 167,886 individuals (68,939 males and 98,947 
females). The ISTAT survey is based on a 16% sample of these students and is stratified on the 
basis of degree course taken and by the sex of the individual student. The response rate is about 
69.5%, yielding a data-set containing information on 26,570 graduates. The data contain 
information on educational curriculum, occupational status and the student’s family background and 
personal characteristics. 
In particular, the principal variables contained in the data set can be divided into the following five 
main groups. (i) University career and high school background: including, kind of high school 
attended, high school mark, other education, university, subject, duration, degree score, 
accommodation, work during university, post graduate studies; (ii) work experience: including, 
previous experience, experience in actual work, type of work, net monthly wage; (iii) search for 
work: including, kind of work desired, willingness to work abroad, preference overworking hours, 
minimum net monthly wage required; (iv) family information: including, parents’ work, parents’ 
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education level, brothers and/or sisters; (v) personal characteristics: including, date of birth, sex, 
marital status, children, country of domicile, country of birth, residence. 
 
Table 1. Average earnings and employment probability by gender and field of study 
 
Field of study Average monthly 
earnings 
Average employment 
probability 
 Male students Female students Male students Female students 
Sciences 1252.36 1065.03 0.69 0.66 
Pharmacy  1280.79 1137.91 0.74 0.76 
Natural sciences  1232.25 1062.48 0.65 0.59 
Medicine  1468.22 1234.35 0.45 0.27 
Engineering  1391.70 1287.06 0.92 0.83 
Architecture  1221.35 1054.29 0.87 0.82 
Agricultural studies  1141.59 905.72 0.77 0.70 
Economics, Business and Statistics 1349.92 1169.86 0.83 0.77 
Political Science and Sociology 1300.48 1096.71 0.78 0.82 
Law  1172.35 1018.93 0.60 0.51 
Humanities  1107.00 948.09 0.69 0.75 
Foreign languages  1204.67 1048.28 0.85 0.80 
Teachers college  1062.94 961.70 0.81 0.79 
Psychology  1078.69 832.67 0.72 0.70 
Health 1098.13 882.75 0.78 0.74 
Total 1299.28 1080.96 0.72 0.63 
 
Table 1 reports average monthly earnings and employment probability 3 years after graduation by 
gender and field of study. Monthly earnings in 2007 are in euros and net of taxes and social security 
contributions. The average earnings are 1299 and 1081 euros per month for the male and the female 
sub sample, respectively. The average employment probability 3 years after graduation is 0.72 and 
0.63 for male and female candidates, respectively. 
In the empirical analysis of Section 2, we estimate the earnings equation for male and female 
samples. 
 
 
2 – Earnings Equations 
 
The following earnings equation was estimated for full-time employees: 
 
 
ln(w) = α + β1 edperf + β’2E + β’3X+ β’4Z + ε   (1) 
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where w is the monthly wage, “edperf” is educational performance, E is a vector of educational 
dummy variables, X is a vector of personal characteristics and Z is a vector of regional dummy 
variables. 
Two dimensions of educational performance are taken into account: degree score and the speed at 
which students complete their academic career. In order to take into account both dimensions, we 
build up the following measure for educational performance: 
 
                     dscore 
edperf = -------------------------- 
                1 + 010 × years 
 
where “dscore” is the degree mark plus the laude or highest honors when it occurs4.  
Table 2 reports results from estimating gender-specific earnings equations controlled for self-
selection. We estimate the sample selection model by means of the Heckman (1979) two-step 
procedure. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the net monthly wage. We first 
consistently estimate the selection equations, binary choice type equations, where the binary 
variable simply indicates working or not working. The estimation is conducted by means of probit 
maximum likelihood. We then use the estimation results of the first stage to consistently estimate 
by OLS the linear earning equations. Our specification incorporates labor market experience5 and 
educational performance. In order to capture the impact of differences in regional wages we include 
dummies for region of residence. We include also family background variables as the level of 
education, the employment status and occupation of the father. We add further information on the 
educational attainment and the work experience: work during the university, minimum degree score 
needed for present work, obtainment of professional qualification. We try to exploit the richness of 
                                                 
4
  - The degree scores in the publicly available data are provided in brackets rather than as a continuous variables. They 
fall into four intervals (<79, 80–89, 90–94, 95–99) and for scores higher than 99 the effective value is disposable. We 
treat the degree mark as continuous variable by using the midpoint of each range when the value is not available. The 
number of years in excess (“years”) used to get the degree is eventually corrected for those having carried out military 
service during their university years. Obviously, the degree scores have been normalized to take into account the 
different marking scale for each faculty. The final degree score ranges from 66 to 110 (for some universities the 
maximum mark awarded is 100). According to each faculty internal ruling a laude (distinction) may be assigned to 
candidates with a 110/110 mark for recognition of the excellence of their thesis (in this analysis the 110 cum laude was 
transformed to 113). 
5
 We make use of the age to approximate the labor market experience. We consider also the square of labor market 
experience to take into account non linear effects. 
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our data set by considering all variables statistically and economically significant in explaining the 
wage gap (Tab. 2-9).  
 
 
Table 2. OLS estimation results of the earnings equation for employees (male and female samples) 
 
Variable 
Earnings equation (employees) 
Female Male 
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value 
CONSTANT 6.451078 80.249 6.516929 89.401 
Educational performance 0.000950 4.031 0.001423 5.301 
lambda 0.383831 6.319 0.414517 7.583 
experience -0.036356 -6.557 0.016100 1.465 
experience2 0.004010 5.722 -0.001348 -1.141 
Sciences 0.189980 4.621 0.075470 2.594 
Pharmacy 0.290410 6.725 0.150891 5.120 
Natural sciences 0.130703 3.820 0.062717 1.939 
Engineering 0.360510 7.515 0.253378 7.238 
Architecture 0.183003 3.857 0.121772 3.219 
Agricultural studies 0.138144 3.090 0.058937 1.561 
Economics, business and statistics 0.246893 6.207 0.168118 5.653 
Political sciences and sociology 0.203020 4.692 0.074503 2.384 
Law 0.075950 2.721 0.042657 1.507 
Humanities 0.131889 3.114 -0.077757 -2.105 
Foreign languages 0.162961 3.879 0.016601 0.391 
Teachers college 0.111559 2.432 0.056077 1.162 
Psychology 0.082282 1.645 0.043418 0.979 
Hours worked (Q2_21) 0.008788 8.024 0.007432 6.449 
University of North -0.052636 -3.973 -0.011993 -0.804 
University of Center -0.010915 -0.766 0.043994 2.943 
d Liceo -0.017863 -1.904 0.002172 0.235 
d Previously entered another degree course 0.005927 0.490 0.012281 0.894 
d Studied in the hometown 0.000538 0.068 0.003824 0.440 
d Moved to attend university 0.034356 3.784 0.032285 3.018 
d Working student 0.096551 7.163 0.076887 6.731 
Training -0.090338 -6.441 -0.107812 -7.538 
Married 0.005629 0.685 0.080510 6.880 
Children -0.009754 -0.620 0.091021 4.602 
d Father’s university degree 0.030699 2.294 0.007577 0.509 
d Father’s high school degree 0.018705 1.967 0.004630 0.421 
d Mother’s degree -0.002357 -0.162 0.009058 0.567 
d High school -0.005666 -0.598 0.011621 1.083 
d Father’s occupation: manager 0.015552 1.036 0.030424 1.903 
d Father’s occupation: executive cadre -0.003928 -0.280 0.027497 1.839 
d Father’s occupation: white collar -0.000960 -0.086 0.001874 0.154 
d Mother’s occupation: executive cadre 0.011883 0.812 -0.021382 -1.375 
d Mother’s occupation: white collar 0.019560 1.942 0.006837 0.628 
Erasmus 0.031319 2.666 0.052507 4.020 
Firm size 0.089913 6.131 0.074524 3.547 
d Attended private courses at university 0.020647 0.995 0.001685 0.066 
d Father employed 0.004156 0.230 -0.000877 -0.041 
d Father self-employed 0.023489 2.481 0.023034 2.074 
Industrial sector 0.022993 2.527 0.037864 4.124 
Paid training -0.145341 -5.817 -0.120088 -4.218 
Region dummies X  X  
Number of observations 3744  3709  
Rbar-squared 0.1480  0.1460  
F  11.805 (0.00)  11.596 (0.00)  
Average wage women (ln) 7.1099409    
Average wage men (ln) 7.2269904    
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Table 3. Estimation results of the employment probabilities for employees (male and female 
samples) 
 
Variable 
Employment probabilities (employees) 
Female Male 
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value 
CONSTANT -0.40774 -2.880 0.11501 0.770 
Educational performance 0.00211 2.660 -0.00004 -0.050 
Sciences 0.79611 9.810 0.31538 4.520 
Pharmacy 1.10942 18.530 0.51041 7.530 
Natural sciences 0.56726 9.820 0.19276 2.760 
Engineering 1.34976 19.820 1.24828 24.280 
Architecture 1.24957 18.570 0.87663 11.880 
Agricultural studies 0.91999 11.510 0.62628 7.280 
Economics, business and statistics 0.99523 22.500 0.75041 15.470 
Political sciences and sociology 1.15891 22.230 0.62422 9.810 
Law 0.39985 9.290 0.21823 4.360 
Humanities 0.99855 17.350 0.33098 4.420 
Foreign languages 1.05389 16.320 0.68531 5.190 
Teachers college 1.16688 16.77 0.90959 6.440 
Psychology 0.86643 10.370 0.51204 5.310 
University of North -0.03092 -0.610 0.05380 0.970 
University of Center -0.03418 -0.750 0.04650 0.930 
d Liceo -0.18332 -6.140 -0.09455 -2.870 
d Moved to attend university 0.04979 1.620 0.05416 1.560 
Erasmus 0.00179 0.040 -0.04484 0.930 
Married 0.02327 0.770 0.29326 7.030 
Children -0.24011 -5.470 0.18525 2.710 
d Father’s university degree 0.02472 0.550 -0.05689 -1.140 
d Father’s high school degree 0.06245 0.100 0.03627 0.920 
d Mother’s degree -0.01029 -0.210 0.01988 0.370 
d High school 0.00679 0.200 0.03721 0.095 
d Father’s occupation: manager -0.03102 -0.600 -0.01754 -0.320 
d Father’s occupation: executive cadre 0.01070 0.220 -0.06419 -1.250 
d Father’s occupation: white collar 0.02907 0.760 -0.01106 -0.250 
d Mother’s occupation: executive cadre -0.02730 -0.580 -0.01326 -0.260 
d Mother’s occupation: white collar -0.02826 -0.830 -0.01810 -0.470 
d Father employed 0.02325 0.380 0.06934 0.098 
d Father self-employed 0.08043 2.460 -0.00925 -0.240 
d Attended private courses at university 0.24619 2.970 0.08003 0.096 
d Working student 0.38804 14.770 0.39104 13.220 
Training -0.52419 -15.990 -0.71315 -19.740 
Region dummies X  X  
Number of observations 13499  11909  
Percent Correctly Predicted 73.8944  78.1678  
 
Moreover, we use whenever possible, the same set of variables to explain the wage gap between all 
the population groups considered6. 
We note that there is a significant gender difference in graduates earnings: female average earnings 
are about 89% of male average earnings. From the separate regression analyses by gender, we 
calculate the Oaxaca decomposition and find that only about 12% of the gender gap can be 
                                                 
6
  - OLS estimation results of the earnings equations underlying Tables 3-9 are conducted similarly to the earnings 
equation presented in Table 2. Calculations are not presented here for brevity, but will be provided by the authors to 
anyone who requests. 
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explained by differences in average observed characteristics. The remaining 88% of the gender gap 
is attributable to gender differences in unobserved characteristics7. 
 
 
3 – Gender pay gap versus other differences in pay between groups 
 
We ask first whether our data are too poor to explain wage differences arising among heterogeneous 
individuals since the early years after graduation. So we try to check the adequacy of the data to 
explain the differences in wages other than the gender pay gap.  
 
Tab. 4 - Gender pay gap versus other differences in pay between groups 
 
 
Explained pay gap Unexplained pay gap Raw pay gap % 
Gender pay gap (Male employees versus 
Female employees) 12,23 87,77 11,05 
Public sector versus Private sector 80,32 19,48 0,74 
Self-employed versus Employees 65,02 34,98 6,34 
Permanent contracts versus Fixed-term 
contracts 
40,44 59,56 13,18 
Graduate degree required versus not 
required (overeducation) 48,40 51,60 9,44 
Recruitment through open competition 
versus without open competition 66,31 33,69 1,37 
 
Table 4 presents the gender pay gap and other differences in pay between groups separating the 
differential explained by observable characteristics from the residual unexplained reflecting the 
different returns to the same characteristics. The comparison between several types of wage 
differentials shows that the gender wage gap is of substantial amount and by far the most 
unexplained among the above considered groups.  
In the literature, the factor most commonly cited to explain the gender pay gap is the impact of 
motherhood and the uneven division of domestic responsibilities on women lifetime earnings 
profile (Eurostat 2009, p. 7). For example, more women than men tend to match to part-time jobs 
that have lower returns and less training opportunities due to coping with childbirth and care. These 
differences in labour market choices make women to accumulate lower work experience compared 
to men and therefore to have lower earnings. But in our sample we only consider individuals 
                                                 
7
  - Castagnetti and Rosti (2009) find very similar results using a different data set and Castagnetti and Rosti (2010) find 
very similar results running a slightly different methodology. Rustichelli (2010) finds a gender pay gap in employees 
hourly earnings of 7% using data from ISFOL-GPG 2007 survey (13,9% for the sample of graduates). 
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working full time for more than 30 hours per week, and three years after graduation men and 
women usually neither tend to be parents yet nor they have accumulate significant work experience.  
A second factor found to be significant in many empirical studies on gender differences in pay even 
at the beginning of a career is the choice of college majors (Eide 1994; Brown and Corcoran 1997; 
Daymont and Andrisani 1984; Lin 2010). Female students tended to concentrate in areas with lower 
pay, such as education, health and psychology, while male students dominated higher-paying fields 
such as engineering, mathematics and physical sciences.  
Our data, however, documents large gender disparities in pay that persist even between individuals 
who studied the same fields (Tab. 5), and even controlling for standardized test score (eduperf) does 
not reduce significantly the unexplained pay disparity in our regression analysis. 
The results of our regression analysis show that even controlling for a lot of variables whose effects 
may be part of the explanation of the gender pay gap, the unexplained component remains 
nevertheless high in each field of study. 
 
Tab. 5 - Gender pay gap by college majors 
 
College majors Explained pay gap Unexplained pay gap Raw pay gap % 
Total  Empolyment 27,03 72,98 11,55 
1 Humanities 10,55 89,45 8,86 
2 Economics, business and statistics 12,74 87,26 9,25 
3 Political science and sociology 56,77 43,23 8,95 
4 Sciences 1,83 98,17 10,27 
5 Law 53,68 46,32 3,11 
6 Engineering 16,40 83,60 6,64 
7 Architecture 13,98 86,02 10,02 
8 Medicine 46,72 53,28 16,13 
Empolyees 12,23 87,77 11,05 
1 Humanities 23,14 76,86 5,73 
2 Economics, business and statistics 7,99 92,01 8,88 
3 Political science and sociology 4,01 95,99 7,85 
4 Sciences 0,69 99,31 9,54 
5 Law 58,35 41,65 9,33 
6 Engineering 15,02 84,98 5,84 
7 Architecture 19,19 80,81 11,44 
8 Medicine 52,12 47,88 11,72 
 
Why a woman who acquires the same human capital endowment of a man and makes the same 
career choices as a man does not receive the same reward? 
In the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) approach, discrimination is defined as the difference 
between the observed gender pay ratio and the gender pay ratio that would prevail if men and 
women were paid according to the same criteria (Grimshaw and Rubery 2002). As by definition 
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labour market discrimination is characterized by unequal treatment of equally productive persons, 
empirical evidence showing wage disparity greater than productivity disparities are consistent with 
discrimination (Hersch 2006). Unfortunately, in our data we have no information on actual 
productivity of university graduates. But we know from the psychological literature that the 
assessment of productivity in the workplace is strongly influenced by stereotypes, that is non-
conscious hypotheses, beliefs or expectations that affect our judgments of others8. A large body of 
research suggests that all of us - regardless of our sex and the social group we belong to - perceive 
and treat people based on their gender (Valian 1998, Schein 2001). Adopting a stereotype-
consistent view is automatic and unintentional (Devine 1989), and often at odds with our conscious 
intentions and our beliefs (Dovidio 2001)9. Moreover, the ways that men and women are treated 
differently may be perceived as being in the best interest of women (Fuegen et al. 2004)10. Further, 
and perhaps even more importantly, acting on stereotypes can be nearly imperceptible at individual 
level and emerge only when aggregated across individuals.11 
Stereotypes and prejudice preclude the fair assessment of individual performance and create 
workplace discrimination. Psychological research has demonstrated that even when the actual 
qualifications of men and women have proved to be equivalent, evaluations of female employees 
are less positive than for men12.  
We hypothesize that gender stereotypes as “a woman after pregnancy is a resource for the company 
lost” or “think manager, think male” affect the assessment of individual productivity and represent a 
major cause of statistical discrimination that is realized in the unexplained component of the gender 
pay gap. 
Section 4 documents how gender stereotypes impact on subjective assessment of individual 
productivity, and consequently on the gender pay gap and careers of male and female graduates. 
                                                 
8
 - For a general overview of cognitive analysis of stereotypes and stereotyping, see Hamilton and Trolier (1986). 
9
  - Dovidio (2001) shows that even individuals carrying strong egalitarian values and fully convinced of the duty to 
give equal treatment to men and women may behave in a discriminatory manner. 
10
 - Adverse employment decisions based on gender stereotypes are sometimes well-intentioned and perceived by 
the employer as being in the employee’s best interest. Employers may think that they are behaving considerately 
when they act on stereotypes that they believe correspond to characteristics that women should have, such as the 
belief that working mothers with young children should avoid extensive travel. For example, an employer might 
assume that a working mother would not want to relocate to another city, even if it would mean a promotion 
(Williams and Segal 2003). 
11
 Crosby (1984), for example, demonstrated that women do not acknowledge the ways that gender discrimination 
may have affected their own career experiences. They are more likely to assume personal responsibility for 
receiving fewer organizational resources than their male coworkers. 
12
 - See, for example, the meta-analysis by Olian, Schwab and Haberfeld (1988), and, more recently, the meta-
analysis by Swim and Sanna (1996). 
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Note that the focus of Section 3 is not the impact of childcare and other forms of caregiving on the 
gender pay gap. The focus is on statistical discrimination, that is pre-judgment by which women 
may be perceived as more committed to caregiving than to their jobs and less competent than other 
workers, regardless of how their caregiving responsibilities actually impact their work. Relying on 
these stereotypes, some employers may assume that childcare responsibilities will make female 
employees less dependable than male employees, even if a woman is not a mother and has no 
intention to become a mother. 
 
 
4 – The effect of gender stereotypes on subjective assessment of individual productivity 
 
In Italy, equal pay and sex discrimination legislation have been in place since 1991. New entrants to 
the labor market in the mid-2000s grew up in a society which encouraged them to take equal 
opportunities for granted. Similarly, no employer would deny in principle the employees right to be 
evaluated as a single individual, that is according to their personal characteristics rather than as 
members of a group having certain average characteristics. As a consequence, it is tempting to 
believe that discrimination is a thing of the past, currently carried out only by a small set of 
uninformed people. Yet even today employment decisions based on gender stereotypes rather than 
on the specific work performance may prevent many women from advancing in their careers. 
Beliefs and prejudices based on gender preclude the accurate assessment of individual productivity 
(Martell and DeSmet 2001), and the pervasiveness of sex role expectations is a primary cause that 
prevents women to reach top managerial positions (Schein 2001). Even very small differences in 
treatment can, as they accumulate, have major consequences in salary, promotion, and prestige, 
including advancement to leadership positions (Valian 1998; Becker 1985; Merton 1968). 
Research has shown that the “ideal employee” is currently still in line with characteristics such as 
rarely taking time off, having few personal obligations, and maintaining an unwavering 
commitment to the job over long periods of time. But these expectations associated with the 
prototype model of the employee are linked to a time when the workforce was comprised mostly of 
men married to women confined to household duties and childcare. As more mothers have entered 
the labour force, families have increasingly faced conflicts between work and caregiving 
responsibilities, resulting in a “caregiver stereotype” or “maternal wall” that prevents many women 
from advancing in their careers (Heilman and Okimoto 2008). 
Similarly, the “successful manager” is consistently described as more similar to the way men are 
viewed than to the way women are viewed (Heilman et al. 1989; Schein, 1973). Men are 
stereotypically perceived as “more ambitious”, “more agentic” and “better leaders” than women 
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(Fiske and Stevens 1993; Jost and Kay 2005; Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt 2001), and women are 
viewed as “not assertive enough”, or “too much emotional”, or “not enough agentic” to fill 
leadership positions (Eagly and Karau 2002), resulting in a “think manager-think male” stereotype 
or “glass ceiling” that excludes many women from apical jobs and hampers the optimal movement 
of talent between organizational ranks.13 
There is a growing empirical literature showing that because of stereotypes, an identical 
performance is assessed differently for men and women14. Consequently, imprecise knowledge 
about the productivity of young women or their career preferences may lead to systematic 
underestimation of the productivity of this group. 
Olian, Schwab and Haberfeld (1988) present a meta-analysis of 19 studies conducted on 1,842 
individuals assessing the applications for recruitment represented by an identical curriculum 
attributed to either a man or a woman. The results show that the positive responses (recruitment) 
were directed more often to men. 
Dobbins, Cardy and Truxillo (1988) show that individuals who evidenced traditional stereotypes 
about women appraised women’s true performance less accurately than those who did not express 
traditional stereotypes.  
Correll, Benard and Paik (2007) analyze applications for a job sent through an identical curriculum 
by two groups of individuals (mothers and non-mothers). The evaluators found the mothers less 
competent and less suitable for recruitment and promotions, and offered them lower wages than 
non-mothers. 
Kobrynowicz and Biernat (1997) document the assessment of skills contained in an identical 
curriculum presented alternately with a female name or a male name in the selection for a 
management role (typically considered masculine in the stereotype).  
The same skills were evaluated twice if attributed to a man instead of a woman. 
Sackett, DuBois and Noe (1991) show that women were systematically rated as performing less 
well than men even after controlling for ability and experience, and that the gender discrepancy in 
evaluations was greater in male gender-typed jobs.  
Due to statistical discrimination mechanisms, sex role stereotypes may have had negative effects on 
the compensation and careers of all women. According to Coate and Loury (1993), statistical 
discrimination against women gives employers an incentive to offer women jobs with a lower level 
                                                 
13
 Schein (2001) demonstrated that around the globe, the role of manager is viewed as more closely aligned with 
the characteristics ascribed to men than women: this was the case in China, Germany, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom. Because of the perceived lack of fit between what women are like and the traits presumed to be 
necessary for success at many of the most prestigious jobs and occupations, women are viewed less favorably than 
their male colleagues.  
14
 - See, for example, Cole et al. (2004). 
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of on-the-job-training. Further, if women are aware of the existence of statistical discrimination in 
advance, this may discourage even well qualified graduates from investing in skills or discourage 
them to apply for promotion.  
Even if gender stereotypes are systematic and pervasive in our daily life (Sabini 1995), their use 
does not have the same importance in every organizational context (Heilman 1997, Hunt et al. 
2002). In Section 5 we try to identify some specific environment in which the use of stereotypes is 
more or less likely to exert an influence on performance appraisal, and we verify that the 
unexplained component of the gender pay gap increases or decreases in line with the influence of 
the stereotype. 
 
 
5 – Gender stereotyping in the workplace is more likely to occur when …  
 
We consider first a context in which the assessment of productivity is unnecessary (self-
employment), thereby eliminating the fuel for discrimination by employers (Section 5.1).  
We then consider an environment in which the assessment of productivity is negligible (executive 
jobs and temporary contracts), thus reducing the motivation of the evaluator to make an accurate 
assessment (Section 5.2). 
Finally, we study a context where the assessors are required to provide justifications of their choices 
and must use objective criteria and structured evaluation procedures (recruitment through open 
competition), thereby increasing the incentive for a more accurate assessment of individual 
performance (Section 5.3). 
 
 
5.1 - Context in which the assessment of productivity is unnecessary (self employment) 
 
Sex stereotypes in performance evaluation do not operate when the assessment of individual 
productivity is unnecessary, as in self-employment. The self employed are in fact employers of 
themselves, and know their own productivity without any kind of assessment. Following Moore 
(1983) we hypothesize that the existence of employer discrimination leads to some testable 
prediction regarding earnings differences by sex for wage and salary workers versus their self-
employed counterparts. Self employment as a method of avoid discrimination by employers should 
result in a higher gender pay gap among the self employed workers than among employees. 
In our data (Tab. 6), the unexplained component of the gender pay gap is lower among the self-
employed workers than it is among employees. 
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Tab. 6 - Gender pay gap in self employment and employees 
 
 
Explained pay gap Unexplained pay gap Raw pay gap % 
Employees  12,23 87,77 11,05 
Self employed 27,83 72,16 12,13 
 
 
5.2 - Context in which the assessment of productivity is negligible, less important and less 
accurate (executive jobs and temporary contracts) 
 
An area in which stereotypes are more likely to exert an influence consists of situations in which the 
perceiver is not motivated to make accurate judgments, as in executive jobs. In lower-level 
occupations, characterized by purely executive tasks, the criteria used to assess individual 
productivity are often unspecified. In the absence of concrete criteria, inference is required to draw 
implications from performance information, and expectations based on stereotypes tend to dominate 
in the structuring of judgments, allowing for an orderly, if not necessarily accurate, judgment 
process (Heilman 2001; Nieva and Gutek 1980).  
These conditions create the fuel for gender-based decision-making, because evaluators rely on their 
stereotypes when deciding whom to hire or promote, or what an appropriate salary increase will be. 
In our data (Tab. 7), the unexplained component of the gender pay gap is lower in intellectual 
professions, scientific and highly specialized occupations than in executive, low-level occupations. 
 
 
Tab. 7 - Gender pay gap between intellectual professions, technical professions and executive 
professions (total employment). 
 
 
Explained pay gap Unexplained pay gap Raw pay gap % 
1 Intellectual professions, scientific and 
highly specialized occupations 44,39 55,60 11,44 
2 Intermediate professions (technical) 42,18 57,82 10,50 
3 Professions relating to the 
administration and executive management 21,80 78,19 9,08 
 
Another context in which stereotypes are more likely to operate because the employer is less 
motivate to make accurate judgments is that of temporary work. Firms may use fixed term contracts 
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as a probationary stage during which they can observe individual performance (Loh 1994; Wang 
and Weiss 1998; Booth et al. 2002). In this case, productivity evaluation is less important because 
expiry of the contract eliminates the error of assessment by not renewing the contract. Therefore, 
the estimate of productivity is less accurate and more superficial, and leaves room for the 
stereotype.  
 
Tab. 8 - Gender pay gap between employees hired under fixed term contracts and permanent 
contracts 
 
 
Explained pay gap Unexplained pay gap Raw pay gap % 
Permanent contracts 33,06 66,94 12,70 
Fixed term contracts 19,24 80,76 7,18 
 
 
In our data (Tab. 8), the unexplained component of the gender pay gap is greater among employees 
hired under fixed term contracts than it is among employees hired under permanent wage contracts. 
 
 
5.3 - Context in which managers must use objective evaluation criteria and structured 
evaluation procedures, and must justify their decisions (open competition – concorsi) 
 
The stereotyping literature indicates that ambiguity in human resource practices can create the 
conditions for gender stereotypes to flourish (Welle and Heilman 2007). Open competitions may be 
a good device to resolve this ambiguity and detect personal characteristics and abilities beyond what 
signalled by the attained level of education. 
Heilman (2001) and Heilman and Okimoto (2008) suggest that ambiguity in evaluative criteria and 
a lack of structure in the evaluation process are two factors that affect devaluation of women's work. 
Therefore, in environments where the judgment criteria are more specific, and the assessment 
procedure is more structured, the information can not easily be distorted to fit the stereotypes. 
Tetlock and Kim (1987) find that people show more complexity and greater accuracy in 
productivity assessments when they anticipate having to justify their ratings. Dobbs and Crano 
(2001) show that individuals who have to justify their decisions have a stronger incentive to bypass 
their stereotyped impressions than those who do not have to make justifications. When 
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decisionmakers are required to justify the decisions they make and describe the criteria they use to 
evaluate candidates, as in open competition, they are less likely to discriminate against women.  
In open competitions (Tab. 9), the recruitment procedure is a combination of examinations, scrutiny 
of the curriculum and qualifications, and interviews. 
 
Tab. 9 - Gender pay gap between employees recruited through open competition and without open 
competition. 
 
 
Explained pay gap Unexplained pay gap Raw pay gap % 
Recruitment through open competition 39,64 60,36 12,12 
Recruitment without open competition 33,99 66,01 12,09 
 
When employees are recruited through open competition, performance appraisal is more objective, 
more structured and less ambiguous, thereby reducing the conditions for gender stereotypes to 
flourish. In our data (Tab. 9), when employees are recruited through open competition the 
unexplained component of the gender pay gap is lower. 
 
 
6 – Does an excellent educational performance reduce the gender pay gap and its unexplained 
residual?  
 
In summary, psychological research suggests that, without any information about the prior 
successes of an applicant, people tend to automatically assume that male candidates are more 
qualified and competent than female candidates. In order to counteract these perceptions and their 
consequences, some women may self-promote and make explicitly clear that they are exceptionally 
qualified candidates and top performers in their field. Sorting models of education (Arrow 1973; 
Spence 1973; Stiglitz 1975; Weiss 1995; Riley 2001) suggest that education is often used to draw 
inferences about unobserved characteristics of individuals: if the abilities that are correlated with 
schooling positively affect productivity on the job, education may be a good signal of a worker’s 
productivity. 
This may be the informative role of educational performance. 
But our data show that being excellent at school does not ensure that a woman will be rewarded as 
an equivalently performing man, since an excellent educational performance increases gender pay 
gap from 11,55% to 14,32% (Tab. 10).  
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Tab. 10 - Gender pay gap between graduates with excellent educational performance and total 
graduates 
Gender pay gap Explained pay gap Unexplained pay gap Raw pay gap % 
Excellent graduates (eduperf=113) 48,07 51,92 14,32% 
Total graduates  27,03 72,98 11,55% 
 
However, our data also show that signalling activities such as an excellent educational performance 
can reduce ambiguity in personnel evaluation and help counteract the effect of stereotyping, since 
achieving the maximum degree mark reduces the unexplained component of the gender pay gap 
(from 88% to 57%). 
 
Conclusions 
 
By estimating the earnings equation for male and female employees working in full-time status 
three years after graduation we find a gender wage gap of 11%, and even controlling for a lot of 
individuals and jobs characteristics, whose effects may be part of the explanation of pay disparity, 
the unexplained component due to differences in returns to observed characteristics remains 
nevertheless high (near to 88% in our data). 
We check the adequacy of the data to explain the differences in wages other than the gender gap, 
and by comparing several types of wage differentials (Public versus Private sector, Self-
employment versus Employees, Permanent versus Temporary contracts, and so on) we find that the 
gender gap is by far the most unexplained among the above considered groups. 
We wonder what unobserved something is it that can’t be measured, is correlated with sex, and 
explains more of a pay disparity that known determinants of earnings such as education and work 
experience, and we hypothesize that the effects of gender discrimination may be an important cause 
of the unexplained component of the gender pay gap. 
Since new entrants to the labor market in the mid-2000s grew up in a society which encouraged 
them to take equal opportunities for granted, it is tempting for young graduates of today to believe 
that discrimination is a thing of the past. Yet, even today, employment decisions based on gender 
rather than on the specific work performance may prevent many women from advancing in their 
careers, and even being excellent at school does not ensures that a woman will be rewarded as an 
equivalently performing man. 
In the Oaxaca- Blinder approach, discrimination is defined as the difference between the observed 
gender pay gap and the gender pay gap that would prevail if men and women were paid according 
to the same criteria. Thus, empirical evidence showing wage disparity greater than productivity 
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disparity is consistent with discrimination. Psychological research has demonstrated that even when 
the actual productivity of men and women has proved to be equivalent, evaluations of female 
employees are less positive than for men. Unfortunately, in our data we have no information on 
actual productivity of university graduates. However, we know from the psychological literature 
that the assessment of productivity in the workplace is strongly influenced by stereotypes that 
preclude the fair assessment of individual performance and create workplace discrimination. 
We test the hypothesis that gender stereotypes affecting the assessment of individual productivity 
represent a major cause of statistical discrimination that is realized in the unexplained component of 
the gender pay gap. We identify some contexts in which stereotypes are more likely to occur and we 
verify that the most likely the stereotype, the higher the unexplained component of the gender pay 
gap.  
In order to reduce discrimination, personnel decisions should be guided by a structured program to 
ensure that men and women are being evaluated on the same criteria. Test performance, number of 
projects completed, amount of revenue generated, and other quantifiable indicators are relatively 
easy to collect and judge, and they are also more difficult to distort in gender-consistent ways than 
more subjective measures. For example, we find evidence that in contexts in which managers use 
more structured evaluation procedures as in open competition (concorsi) the unexplained 
component of the gender pay gap is lower. 
It is important to be aware that the gender pay gap is influenced by gender stereotypes that affect 
the assessment of women’s productivity when they enter the labour market or are in the early years 
of their working life. Very small differences in treatment can, as they accumulate, have major 
consequences in salary, promotion, and prestige, including advancement to leadership positions. 
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